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New methods in quantitative ethnography: economic
experiments and variation in the price of equality
Abstract
We present a new method for quantitatively documenting concerns for economic fairness. In particular
we focus on the method's potential for identifying variation in prosociality within and across societies.
Specifically, we conducted multiple dictator games per player in two small-scale societies. Each game
presented the decision maker with a choice between an equitable and an inequitable payoff distribution.
The games varied in terms of the type of inequality the decision maker faced and in terms of the cost to
the decision maker of eliminating inequality. This latter variation in cost is what makes the method
suitable for identifying the price one is willing to pay for equality. To analyze the data, we developed a
novel set of statistical models that directly link experimental results and player heterogeneity with the
formal theory of inequality aversion. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the experimental
method can be generalized to allow maximum flexibility in data analysis.
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A new method for quantitatively documenting concerns for
economic fairness has the potential for identifying variation
in prosociality within and across societies. Multiple dictator
games conducted in two small-scale societies presented de-
cision makers with a choice between an equitable and an
inequitable payoff distribution. The games varied in terms of
the type of inequality the decision maker faced and the cost
to the decision maker of eliminating inequality. A novel set
of statistical models directly links experimental results and
player heterogeneity with the formal theory of inequality aver-
sion. The experimental method can be generalized to allow
maximum flexibility in data analysis.
Relative to many other animals, including other primates,
humans appear to be radically prosocial (Camerer 2003; Jen-
sen et al. 2006; Richerson, Boyd, and Henrich 2003; Silk et
al. 2005), a fact that allows humans to realize the benefits of
cooperative interactions in ways unavailable to other species
(Alvard 2003; Bowles 2004). The study of human prosociality
often involves two separate but related phenomena. On the
one hand, people show preferences regarding the distribution
of resources in a social group (Dawes et al. 2007). On the
other hand, in sufficiently complex social settings these pref-
erences are often conditional. People care about the past be-
haviors of other people, and they care about the social pro-
cesses that went into producing a particular distribution of
resources (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004). As a result, the same
distribution can be more or less preferred in different situ-
ations according to the way it is interpreted (Falk, Fehr, and
Fischbacher 2003).
Here we focus on variation in distributional preferences.
Experimental work in small-scale societies indicates that hu-
 2007 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research.
All rights reserved. 0011-3204/2007/4806-0006$10.00. DOI: 10.1086/
523016
mans are not all prosocial in the same way. Variation in pro-
sociality within and across societies is pronounced, and ex-
perimental behavior often relates in intriguing ways to
ethnographic details (Henrich et al. 2004). Such variation is
important because theoretical and experimental work shows
that variation in prosociality interacts with social institutions
to affect economic outcomes (Bowles 2004; Camerer and Fehr
2006; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Fehr and Schmidt 1999;
Guererk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenback 2006).
Experimental games have recently demonstrated great use-
fulness as a tool for measuring prosocial behaviors and norms
in small-scale societies (Camerer and Fehr 2004; Efferson and
Richerson 2007; Henrich et al. 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006; Paciotti
and Hadley 2003). This research has relied on classic games
like dictator, ultimatum, and public goods to measure con-
cerns for fairness and the propensity to cooperate within and
across societies. Here we present a new method for docu-
menting variation in prosociality that combines a measure-
ment instrument from social psychology with a style of sta-
tistical analysis from economics. The result allows us to
quantify distributional preferences in terms of an unambig-
uous theory and to identify which sources of preference het-
erogeneity (e.g., age, income, group membership) the data
justify discussing.
We apply the instrument and statistical method to results
from two independent studies conducted in small-scale societies
in Bolivia and Tanzania. The experiments used in these studies
allow us to estimate and decompose aversion to inequality in
our experimental populations in a precise fashion directly
linked to theory. The question addressed is what price one is
willing to pay for equality and how that price varies within and
among societies. The methods we present provide a unified
approach to this problem by directly integrating theory and
empiricism. These methods are not a replacement for more
traditional ethnographic work. Rather, they provide an effective
quantitative complement. They support both predictive and
descriptive research programs. For example, on the basis of
earlier research (Henrich et al. 2001, 2005), one might predict
that market integration is associated with more aversion to
inequality. One could use the methods described below to test
this prediction wherever one pleases. Alternatively, a researcher
who has a strong qualitative understanding of the fairness
norms in a particular society could use the methods to quantify
this knowledge precisely. This latter notion is an example of
what we mean by “quantitative ethnography.”
Methods
We focus on a use of dictator games that documents the
distributional preferences mentioned above with little or no
scope for conditionality (but see Haley and Fessler 2005 for
a different view). These experiments are called dictator games
because one player simply chooses a binding distribution of
resources in an experimental social group. Other players re-
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Figure 1. Graphical illustration of the Fehr-Schmidt model. The
horizontal axis shows variation in y, the payoff of player 2. The
vertical axis shows player 1’s utility, . The payoff of player 1,U1
x, is held constant at the value indicated by the dashed vertical
line. To the left of the dashed line, player 1 faces advantageous
inequality, the relevant utility function is U (x, y)p x b(x1
, and thus the slope is b in this region. To the right of they)
dashed line, inequality is disadvantageous for player 1, U (x,1
, and the slope is . This example assumesy)p xa(y x) a
, and consequently utility reaches its maximum when0 ! b ! a
.yp x
ceive payoffs from dictator choices but can do nothing to
affect the outcome. The decision maker is thus, within the
confines of the experiment, a dictator.
To analyze the data, we developed a novel set of statistical
models derived from the inequality-aversion model of Fehr
and Schmidt (1999). Other empirically successful models of
social preferences exist in the economics literature (Bolton
and Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2002; Falk and
Fischbacher 2006), and we encourage their use in anthro-
pological settings. Nonetheless, our experience suggests that
the Fehr-Schmidt model is especially amenable to developing
statistical models of the sort we present below. Its simple
piece-wise linear form makes it easy to estimate and extend.
Theory
Consider a two-person interaction in which the participants
may be concerned with one another’s payoffs but not with the
payoffs of others outside the pair. Call the payoff of the first
person x and the payoff of the second y. Denote an outcome
. In this simple case the Fehr-Schmidt model says that the(x,y)
utility for the first person is
U (x, y)p xa max{y x, 0}b max{x y, 0},1
where if and otherwise.max{w, z}p w w ≥ z max{w, z}p z
The parameter a measures the first person’s aversion to dis-
advantageous inequality, which is a situation in which the sec-
ond person has more, and the parameter b measures the first
person’s aversion to advantageous inequality, which is a situ-
ation in which the first person has more. When the second
person has more, , which implies thaty x 1 0 max{y x,
and . In this case the model re-0}p y x max{x y, 0}p 0
duces to . Alternatively, when the firstU (x, y)p xa(y x)1
person has more, , which means thatx y 1 0 max{x y,
and . The model in this situation0}p x y max{y x, 0}p 0
becomes . Both a and b are unitlessU (x, y)p xb(x y)1
quantities that measure aversion to inequality in terms of an
equivalent reduction in own payoffs without the inequality. For
example, if , two units of disadvantageous inequalityap 0.5
are equivalent to one unit less in the first person’s own payoff
without the disadvantageous inequality. A distribution of (1,
1) would therefore be equivalent to (2, 4). This holds because
(2, 4), though it brings a higher absolute payoff for player 1
than (1, 1), also brings two units of disadvantageous inequality
for player 2. Formally, , whileU (1, 1)p xp 1 U (2, 4)p1 1
.xa(y x)p 2 (0.5)(4 2)p 1
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the Fehr-
Schmidt model. The horizontal axis measures payoffs and the
vertical axis utility. Player 1’s payoff, x, is fixed for purposes
of this illustration and is indicated by the vertical dashed line.
Player 2’s payoff, y, is then allowed to vary along the hori-
zontal axis, and the corresponding utility of player 1 is shown
as a function of variation in y. To the left of the vertical dashed
line, . Advantageous inequality is thus the relevant con-x 1 y
cept, and b is the relevant measure of inequality version.
Advantageous inequality gets smaller in magnitude as we
move from left to right and so move closer to the vertical
dashed line. The slope of the utility function in this region
is b. To the right of the dashed line, , and player 1 facesy 1 x
disadvantageous inequality. The inequality here gets larger in
magnitude as we move from left to right and thus farther
from the dashed line. The slope of the utility function in this
region is . In figure 1 we have assumed that both typesa
of inequality reduce utility and that having less than someone
else reduces utility more than having more than someone else.
These are typical assumptions for Fehr-Schmidt, but they are
not necessary. Technically, the model does not preclude other
possibilities such as liking having more but hating having less.
This would imply that , and the utility would0 ! a, b ! 0
decline both to the right and to the left of the dashed line.
Experimental Data and Statistical Modeling
By pairing players anonymously and allowing player 1 to play
multiple dictator games in each of which he or she chooses
between an equitable distribution and an inequitable distri-
bution, one can estimate the player’s aversion to the two
different kinds of inequality. This is exactly our approach, and
table 1 shows the 16 dictator games played by each player 1
in our two study populations.
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Table 1. Payoffs for Players 1 and 2 in Experiments
Conducted in Tanzania and Bolivia
Choice
Equitable Inequitable
Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2
1 10 10 15 10
2 10 10 10 15
3 15 15 15 10
4 15 15 10 15
5 10 10 15 5
6 10 10 5 15
7 10 10 18 13
8 10 10 13 18
9 8 8 15 5
10 12 12 15 5
11 8 8 5 15
12 12 12 5 15
13 12 12 18 13
14 8 8 18 13
15 12 12 13 18
16 8 8 13 18
The central concept behind the design of these games may
be illustrated as follows: Imagine a hypothetical player 1 who,
when facing choice 9, chooses (15, 5) over (8, 8). This choice
means that , whichU (15, 5)p 15b(15 5) 1 U (8, 8)p 81 1
further indicates that . Imagine now that the sameb ! 7/10
player chooses (12, 12) over (15, 5) when facing choice 10. In
this case, , andU (12, 12)p 12 1 U (15, 5)p 15b(15 5)1 1
thus . Together these two choices show thatb 1 3/10 3/10 !
. Additional choices would allow us to refine the es-b ! 7/10
timate further. The same reasoning applies for estimating a. If
our player 1 chooses equitably for choice 15, U (12, 12)p1
. If player 1 chooses ineq-12 1 U (13, 18)p 13a(18 13)1
uitably for choice 16, U (13, 18)p 13a(18 13) 1 U (8,1 1
. Together these choices imply that .8)p 8 1/5 ! a ! 1
Unlike our hypothetical player 1, real players exhibit noise
in their choices, and data never match predictions perfectly.
For example, players may from time to time make a choice
that is inconsistent with their other choices. If so, some subset
of choices will violate the preferences specified by the utility
function. Also, because a model is only a representation of a
decision-making process and not the decision-making process
itself, choices may be subject to forces outside the model.
These outside forces are modeled as noise. Apart from noise,
individuals also exhibit heterogeneity in their notions of fair-
ness and in their aversion to inequality. We would like to
identify a parsimonious and effective way of summarizing
this heterogeneity.
Incorporating noise and heterogeneity are the principal
motivations behind the statistical models we developed to
analyze our data. [The details of these models are described
in the electronic edition of this issue on the journal’s web
page.]
The basic idea is intuitive. As figure 1 shows, the a and b
values specify the slope of the utility function for disadvan-
tageous and advantageous inequality respectively. Equiva-
lently, a and b specify the magnitude of aversion to inequality.
Simply put, we model these quantities as functions of pre-
dictor variables of interest. This technique is what permits
the incorporation of heterogeneity. For example, one might
model a and b as functions of household wealth to see if
wealthier households tend to have individuals with more or
less aversion to inequality.
We do not treat the resulting model as a deterministic
predictor of choices in the experiment. Rather, a utility func-
tion and a set of alternative payoff distributions from which
to choose jointly produce a probability distribution over
choices (i.e., alternative payoff distributions). This probability
distribution depends on both the properties of the alternative
payoff distributions and the modeled characteristics of the
decision maker. For a given dictator game, our statistical ver-
sion of Fehr-Schmidt will place some positive probability on
each available option. As a result, a specific wealthy individual
might make a choice that is very different from the choice
most wealthy people make in that situation, but the choice
cannot be incompatible with the statistical version of Fehr-
Schmidt in absolute terms, It can be at odds with the model
only in a statistical sense. Such an observation would be a
kind of “outlier.”
Importantly, the two types of inequality are not linked in
the theoretical Fehr-Schmidt model, nor are they linked in
our statistical modification of it. For this reason, estimated
effects can be asymmetric. If wealthy families, for example,
tend to produce individuals averse to disadvantageous in-
equality but not averse to advantageous inequality, the sta-
tistical version of Fehr-Schmidt can pick that up. It does not
require that a class of individuals who are averse to one type
of inequality also be averse to the other type of inequality.
Moreover, as mentioned above, the model also does not re-
quire that people be averse to inequality at all. Both theo-
retically and statistically, negative values of a and b are
possible.
The remaining question concerns the best way to model a
and b. In particular, which predictor variables provide an
effective means of summarizing variation in aversion to in-
equality? To address this question, for each of our two study
sites we developed an a priori set of models that varied the
combination of covariates included, fit the models using max-
imum likelihood, and then used an information theoretic
approach to selecting the best model from the set. A derivative
form (AIC ) of Akaike’s criterion (Akaike 1973) served as ac
model selection criterion. Akaike’s criterion extends likeli-
hood theory to the question of model selection (Burnham
and Anderson 2002). More precisely, when one fits a model
to data using likelihood, one loses information because the
model does not account for all the processes that generated
the data. Akaike’s criterion selects the model estimated to lose
the least amount of information relative to the other models
under consideration. It thus has an intuitive and compelling
interpretation (Burnham and Anderson 2002; Efferson and
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Figure 2. Parameter estimates with approximate 95% confidence
intervals for the four important independent variables in the
analysis of Bolivian data. Estimates for a are shown in dark gray
and estimates for b in light gray. The covariates include the
intercept (Int), the number of sheep, the frame of reference (FR),
market integration (MI), and the number of cooperative activities
with unrelated individuals in the previous year (CAY). The 95%
confidence interval for f is [0.106, 0.186].
Richerson 2007; Forster and Sober 1994). Moreover, this in-
terpretation does not rely on the use of arbitrary and purely
conventional thresholds (e.g., ) as in null-hypothesisp ! 0.05
testing.
Study Sites and Results
Bolivia
Experiments were conducted with adult residents of the Sama
Biological Reserve in southern Bolivia. Sama is on the semi-
arid altiplano of the Bolivian Andes. Elevations range from
about 3,600 to 3,900 m. The residents of Sama focus on
subsistence pastoralism and primarily raise sheep and llamas.
They also do a limited amount of farming, and many families
have at least one or two members who migrate seasonally in
search of wage-paying jobs in agriculture.
Experiments were conducted privately with only the subject
and the experimenter present. The experimenter read a set
of prepared instructions with examples for each player 1. The
experimenter would then test the subject’s comprehension by
presenting different scenarios and asking the subject how
much each player would receive in each.
To improve understanding, the experimenter always used
four piles of money on a table to represent a particular choice.
The four piles represented the payoffs for each of the two
players under the two alternative payoff distributions. To sim-
plify matters further, the two distributions were placed at
opposite ends of the table, and players were told that they
could choose the two piles at one end of the table or the two
piles at the other end. All players were told that they were
playing for real money. Because of previous experiments in
the same communities and because of the high turn-out rate,
we strongly suspect that the players expected to be paid. Actual
payoffs were determined by randomly selecting one of the 16
choices made by each player 1. All players responded to ex-
tensive questionnaires after participating, and these question-
naires provided the social, economic, and demographic data
used in data analysis. Four players 1 did not pass the com-
prehension test and were removed from consideration. The
final data set had 110 players in all, half of whom were players
1. Players 1 and 2 were randomly paired within a community.
Moreover, players 1 who had played, players 1 waiting to play,
and players 2 were kept separated throughout the experiment.
All interactions between paired players were anonymous.
To analyze the data, we developed a set of ten models using
several independent variables in various combinations. The
full set of independent variables under consideration includes
sex, age, education level, the number of sheep owned by the
individual’s household, and three index variables. The first
index variable is the frame of reference (FR), and it sum-
marizes the individual’s beliefs about consumption norms.
Specifically, we asked individuals to specify how many sheep
(the primary measure of wealth in this society) their house-
holds would need to live poorly, normally, well,(a) (b) (c)
and very well. We averaged these four numbers and, as(d)
with all quantitative variables in the analysis, normalized the
resulting variable to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation
of 1. Our market integration (MI) index for Bolivia is based
on the number of different market-oriented productive ac-
tivities (e.g., collecting guano for sale) pursued by the house-
hold in the previous year. Households with more diverse suites
of productive activities aimed toward sale in markets scored
higher using our MI index. The final index variable records
the number of cooperative activities (e.g., maintenance of the
school building) of various sorts the individual participated
in with unrelated individuals in the past year (CAY).
Our analysis indicates that, of the independent variables
under consideration, our market integration (MI) and co-
operative activity (CAY) variables are the most important, but
the number of sheep in the household and the frame of ref-
erence (FR) are also important. Figure 2 shows the estimates
and confidence intervals for the model with these four pre-
dictor variables. As with all the models fit to the data, the
model includes estimated intercepts for a and b, which are
analogous to the intercept in a linear regression. Also anal-
ogous to the intercept in a linear regression, the intercepts in
the statistical Fehr-Schmidt model specify reference levels of
inequality aversion in the sample. Estimated coefficients for
the predictor variables in turn specify deviations from these
reference levels. In this particular case, all predictor variables
are quantitative variables normalized to have a mean of zero.
Consequently, the intercepts quantify a kind of average a
(0.573) and b (0.625) values in the sample and by extension
the average price one is willing to pay to eliminate disadvan-
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Figure 3. Parameter estimates with approximate 95% confidence
intervals for the best-fitting model in the analysis of Tanzanian
data. Estimates for a are shown in dark gray and estimates for
b in light gray. The covariates include the intercept (Int), a female
indicator variable (Fem), age, education level (Educ), and three
indicator variables for ethnicity (MA, NY, and CH). The last two
variables are interactions: female and age# education. The 95%
confidence interval for f is [0.154, 0.234].
tageous and advantageous inequality respectively. Precisely,
the expected willingness to pay for equality is 62.5 centavos
to eliminate 1 boliviano of disadvantageous inequality and
57.3 centavos to eliminate 1 boliviano of advantageous
inequality.
Two effects are unambiguous. Individuals with a higher
market integration score are more averse to disadvantageous
inequality (i.e., have higher a values) and individuals who
participated in more cooperative activities with unrelated in-
dividuals in the previous year are less averse to advantageous
inequality (i.e., lower b values). Three additional effects are
close to unambiguous in the sense that the confidence inter-
vals just barely overlap 0. These effects are an increase in b
values with more market integration, an increase in b values
with an increase in the frame of reference, and a decrease in
b values with more household wealth in the form of sheep.
Tanzania
Experiments were conducted among adults in the village of
Isanga in the Southern Highland region of Tanzania. This
region is semiurban, and most households are economically
specialized. Many residents, however, also produce food and
other items for consumption in the household. Isanga is an
ethnically diverse village, a fact that informed our model se-
lection exercise, but the majority of people are Nyakyusa, a
Bantu group originating south of Isanga.
The methods used in Tanzania were similar to those in
Bolivia. Instead of piles of real money, however, the experi-
menter used preprinted cards with payoffs printed on them.
Cards were shuffled before play, so choices were presented in
random order. Additionally, all Tanzanian players took the
roles of both player 1 and player 2. First they made their 16
choices as players 1, and then as players 2 they were paired
with previous players and shown the choices of the other
players. Of the 16 cards, one was chosen randomly to deter-
mine actual payoffs. The entire procedure was explained to
each player before participating, and a prescreening was per-
formed to ensure comprehension.
We developed a set of 14 models using several independent
variables in various combinations. These variables were cho-
sen because they are classic controls for heterogeneity or be-
cause of specific hypotheses applicable in this context. The
independent variables are sex, age, level of education, wealth,
ethnicity, and market integration. Because too many ethnic
groups are present in the area to estimate reliable parameters
for each, each individual was assigned to one of the following
four ethnic branches: Southern Highland (SH), Central
Highland (CH), Nyamwezi (NY), and Makonde (MA). Ber-
nard (2006) provides a detailed description of the card-sorting
procedure used to assign individuals to these branches. With
four ethnic branches, we have three indicator variables as
predictors for ethnicity (MA, NY, and CH), and the intercepts
absorb the fixed effect for the remaining ethnic branch (SH).
The market integration index combines the following into a
single variable: percent of household diet purchased at the(a)
market, income from wage labor, frequency of wage(b) (c)
labor in the previous month, trips to the market in the(d)
previous week, and frequency of profit-oriented trading(e)
in the previous month.
The analysis shows that sex, age, education, and ethnicity
are the important predictors. Figure 3 shows the results for
the best-fitting model. The best model includes two inter-
action terms. Most of the effects are not unambiguously pos-
itive or negative, suggesting that at least some of the variables
are important controls that cannot be estimated very precisely.
Age, however, is weakly associated with an increase in aversion
to advantageous inequality, and a weak positive interaction
between age and education predicts more aversion to dis-
advantageous inequality. The big effect, however, is the dra-
matically higher level of aversion to advantageous inequality
among individuals in the MA ethnic branch. These are the
Makonde, originally a coastal and matrilineal group quite
different linguistically from the others. They are famous carv-
ers (any tourist to Tanzania has seen their ebony carvings),
and historically they lived in semi-independent villages. The
Makonde may be the only ethnic group in the sample that
did not have chiefs of some kind at the time of European
colonization.
Discussion and Methodological Implications
Variation in prosociality is critical to an understanding of ag-
gregate economic phenomena when the contracts governing
social interactions are incomplete (Bowles 2004; Camerer and
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Fehr 2006; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt
1999; Guererk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenback 2006), a situation
that applies to a greater or lesser extent in all human societies.
Richard, Masanori, and Charles, for example, may be able to
engage in a productive and mutually beneficial social interac-
tion, but if they cannot commit to a fully enforceable contract
that stipulates the appropriate behaviors under every possible
contingency then some degree of mutual vulnerability is in-
volved. Shared expectations about the likely prosocial incli-
nations of the others can help the trio take the leap of faith
necessary for the interaction to happen. Such a setting is ubiq-
uitous because until recently most human societies lacked the
formal institutions that might provide complete or nearly com-
plete contracts. Even now, a truly complete contract has prob-
ably never existed, and thus social interactions inevitably involve
some level of risk. Equality norms constitute only one part of
prosociality, but that part is an important one that can reduce
risk and encourage social exchange.
Although early experimental work in psychology addressed
quantitative variation in prosociality across individuals (Mes-
sick and McClintock 1968; McClintock 1972), apart from the
work of Henrich and colleagues (2001, 2004, 2005, 2006) little
attempt has been made to survey this variation in a way that
even begins to tap the full measure of human behavioral
diversity. Part of the problem is methodological. While ex-
perimental economists tend to implement experiments mo-
tivated by formal theory, anthropologists, the social scientists
with probably the deepest understanding of human behavioral
diversity, are more likely to find raw cultural variation inter-
esting. From a nondisciplinary perspective, the resulting space
of all experiments in all societies is too large to explore. The
experiments that economists find compelling may or may not
be generally useful to fieldworkers in anthropology, and this
may limit the appeal of experiments as a standard comple-
ment to other ethnographic methods. Nonetheless, the var-
iation in prosocial tendencies within and among societies rep-
resents a basic empirical question. The methods we outline
here would allow for an efficient point of departure, especially
if implemented in conjunction with other ethnographic meth-
ods and the classic economic experiments used by Henrich
and colleagues.
In our studies, two results stand out. In Bolivia, both mar-
ket integration and participation in cooperative activities were
related to inequality aversion within the study population.
Henrich et al. (2005) found that market integration and co-
operative activities were positively associated with prosocial
behavior across societies. Their variables and our variables are
quite different, and our result holds within a society, but the
market integration findings can be viewed as complementary.
In Tanzania, one ethnic branch stood out as dramatically more
averse to advantageous inequality than the other three
branches. This result suggests a type of cultural inertia and
limited cultural mixing in the sense that people with different
cultural histories often long maintain their differences even
in the face of ongoing contact and similar economic circum-
stances (Edgerton and Goldschmidt 1971; McElreath, Boyd,
and Richerson 2003; Nisbett and Cohen 1996; Richerson and
Boyd 2005).
We do not wish to make excessive extrapolations from our
modest evidence. Nonetheless, we think that these results
demonstrate the plausibility of incorporating causal variables
of many scales and types into the analysis of individual pro-
social preferences. For example, anthropologists of a previous
generation were concerned with the extent to which economic
decisions in agricultural societies might be motivated by a
concept of “limited good,” a belief in a finite or only slowly
growing amount of “good” in the world (Foster 1965). Under
limited good, one community member’s gain is necessarily
another’s loss. This notion has been implicated in the lack of
entrepreneurship among small-scale agriculturalists because
getting ahead can be seen as immoral if it necessarily hurts
others. The clear prediction that follows is that social pref-
erences as measured in our model will vary both within and
among communities in relation to a belief in limited good.
Communities professing a belief in limited good should be
more averse to inequality of both kinds. Individuals within a
community for whom the idea of limited good is least salient
should be the most entrepreneurial and the least averse to
inequality, especially advantageous inequality. In the final
analysis both group variables (community) and individual
variables (market income, education, adoption of new crops)
could be folded into the analysis to address hypotheses of
broad anthropological interest.
Apart from the specific results, our primary interest is to
illustrate the method. Importantly, however, our model se-
lection exercise did not consider models with individual fixed
effects for each player 1 (i.e., models that effectively estimate
unique a and b intercepts for each player 1). We chose to
proceed this way because numerous individuals in both so-
cieties always chose the equitable distribution. One cannot
estimate a fixed effect for individuals who exhibited no var-
iation in their observed choices because maximizing the like-
lihood function drives the relevant a or b fixed effect to
positive or negative infinity. The use of Akaike’s criterion
requires that all models be fit to the same data. Thus a model
selection exercise with (or even without) individual fixed ef-
fects would have required us to drop all individuals exhibiting
no variation in their choices. We chose instead to model var-
ation purely in terms of social and economic predictors. As
a consequence we potentially overlooked some idiosyncratic
dependence among observations that was unaccounted for in
our models. We evaluated this possibility using the method
described for this purpose by Burnham and Anderson (2002,
67–70) and did not find any obvious problems.
Nonetheless, a superior approach would be to estimate sev-
eral models with individual fixed effects, compare them with
similar models without the fixed effects, and let Akaike’s cri-
terion indicate whether the data justify estimating the addi-
tional parameters. This requires variation in choices for all
subjects, and we correspondingly recommend generalizing the
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Table 2. Finding the b Switching Point for a Hypothetical
Player 1 with Deterministic Choices
Choice
Equitable Inequitable
Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2
1  10 10 10 0
2  10 10 11 1
3  10 10 12 2
4  10 10 13 3
5  10 10 14 4
6 10 10 15 5 
7 10 10 16 6 
8 10 10 17 7 
Note: In this example, the player does not accept 4 monetary units as
compensation for 10 units of advantageous inequality but does accept 5
units. This result means that .0.4 ! b ! 0.5
idea behind table 1 to allow greater flexibility in the set of
choices presented to a given player 1. Specifically, we suggest
the need to find the point where each player switches from
choosing equitably to choosing inequitably or vice versa. Table
2 shows how this might work with respect to estimating b
for a hypothetical player 1.
In this example the level of advantageous inequality is con-
stant at ten units. The absolute cost of reducing this inequality,
however, increases incrementally with each subsequent choice.
Eventually, the absolute cost is too high, and our hypothetical
dictator switches to choosing the inequitable distribution. In
this fashion we identify the price for accepting advantageous
inequality. The approach to disadvantageous inequality is
analogous, but instead choices would be between an equitable
distribution (e.g., [10, 10]) and a distribution involving dis-
advantageous inequality for player 1 (e.g., [14, 24]).
The sequence of choices in table 2 is too transparently
systematic for an actual experiment and could introduce ar-
tifacts as a result. Nonetheless, finding each individual’s
switching point implies the following key point: the experi-
menter should be able to adjust the game for each player 1
contingent on that individual’s play up to a particular point
in time. We put the following proposal forward as a technique
that should be practical under the sometimes difficult con-
ditions of experimental fieldwork (the example focuses on
estimating b, but the approach is easily generalized for a):
Present a block of, say, six choices that range from (10, 10)
versus (10, 0) to (10, 10) versus (15, 5), as in table 2, to the
player in random order. If the player does not show the de-
sired level of variation in play, move to the next block of six
choices, also presented in random order, from (10, 10) versus
(16, 6) to (10, 10) versus (20, 10). One could also alternate
blocks for estimating a with blocks for estimating b to reduce
the potential for a transparent pattern further. One may also
want to prepare for the possibility that some players may
prefer inequality, especially advantageous inequality. Such
players would opt for (10, 0) over (10, 10). The objective in
this case would not be to find the price the player will pay
for equality but rather to find the price the player will pay
for inequality. Will the player take (14, 14) over (10, 0) or,
not, (15, 15) over (10, 0)? This example highlights the pos-
sibilities of the method more generally. Whether estimating
a preference for or against inequality, the general question is
the same, namely, how much will an experimental dictator
with a distinctive set of characteristics pay to accomplish his
or her distributional objectives?
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